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Beautifying the Ugly Step-Sister: Designing an
Effective Cap-and-Trade Program to Reduce
Greenhouse Gas Emissions
I. INTRODUCTION
In his message accompanying the United States 2009 Budget,
President Barack Obama noted,
[T]here are the years that come along once in a generation, when
we look at where the country has been and recognize that we need
a break from a troubled past, that the problems we face demand
that we begin charting a new path. This is one of those years.

Our nation indeed faces many challenges.1 One such challenge that
has risen to the forefront of both the national and global conscience
is that of global warming.
While politicians and the media continue to debate the validity of
global warming,2 an increasing number of the world’s preeminent
scientists believe that “warming of the climate is unequivocal and
that the world is in a crisis now.”3 Coupled with the fact that
President Obama and a majority of Congress are proponents of
reducing greenhouse gases,4 the United States may implement an
emissions regulatory program in the near future. The United States
moved closer to this reality when, in June 2009, the U.S. House of
Representatives approved the American Clean Energy and Security
Act—a bill that would substantially reduce air pollutants by the year
2050.5
If the United States ultimately elects to lower greenhouse gas
emissions, it will likely select from one of two regulatory approaches:
1. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, A NEW ERA OF
RESPONSIBILITY: RENEWING AMERICA’S PROMISE 1 (2009) [hereinafter OFFICE OF MGMT. &
BUDGET], available at http://www. gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy10/pdf/fy10-newera.pdf.
For example, “[o]ur economy is in a deep recession that threatens to be deeper and longer
than any since the Great Depression.” Id.
2. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Energy Independence and Global Warming, 37 ENVTL. L. 595,
597 (2007).
3. Bill Westerfield et al., EBA Climate Change Primer: Cap and Trade, 29 ENERGY
L.J. 173, 174 (2008).
4. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 1, at 13.
5. H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009).
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either a “cap-and-trade system” or a “carbon tax.”6 In a cap-andtrade system, a regulatory body sets a cap on the amount of
allowable carbon emissions; rights to emit carbon under this cap are
then allocated to the regulated entities.7 Ideally, some entities will
need less than their allocable lot, and other entities will require more
than what is distributed to them. This creates a market for emission
rights where entities that need additional permits to pollute may
purchase supplementary units from those who pollute less.8 Carbon
taxes, in contrast, are much simpler: they tax pollutants based on
their concentration of carbon.9
This Comment argues that a carbon tax is the preferred
regulatory approach; however, its political unpopularity makes it an
unlikely solution to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. A cap-andtrade system, the ugly step-sister to a carbon tax, is the most
probable alternative. To be successful, it must be “dressed up” and
include several key components, including (1) a firm cap, (2) a onehundred percent auction of allowances, (3) “carbon offsets,” (4) a
characterization of carbon in the same manner as a currency, and (5)
enforceability.
This Comment focuses, in particular, on the difficult choices
policymakers face in determining how to address global warming.
Part II provides an overview of global warming. It explains the
current scientific research on climate change and discusses the threats
that global warming poses. Part III explains United States reluctance
to admit that climate change is a problem and why it is in the United
States’ interest to implement a system to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions. Part IV discusses the two leading regulatory approaches to
reduce carbon emissions—a carbon tax and cap-and-trade system—
and argues that a cap-and-trade system is the most feasible solution.
Part V introduces several key components that a cap-and-trade
system must possess to be successful, and Part VI concludes this
Comment.
6. Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice, 96 GEO. L.J. 1565,
1574–75 (2008).
7. See Carol M. Rose, From H2O to CO2: Lessons of Water Rights for Carbon Trading,
50 ARIZ. L. REV. 91, 91–92 (2008); see also Leila Abboud, Paying to Pollute: Everything You
Wanted to Know About Cap and Trade . . . But Didn’t Even Know to Ask, WALL ST. J., Sept.
15, 2008, at R12.
8. Abboud, supra note 7.
9. Michael J. Zimmer, Carbon Tax: Ready for Prime Time?, 8 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L.
POL’Y 67, 67 (2008).
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II. GLOBAL WARMING

Although still highly debated, for purposes of this Comment, I
will assume that the anthropogenic global warming hypothesis is
valid and that prompt action is needed to curtail human effects on
the climate. In analyzing this issue for its validity, it is helpful to
review the collaborative efforts of those who seek to draw consensus
from the world’s scientific community10—individual reports may
provide some insight, but they are less reliable than collaborative
efforts.11 This Comment will focus on data and reports compiled by
organizations—such as the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (“IPCC”)—that are subject to extensive peer
evaluation and scientific analysis.
The IPCC was promulgated to review and publish objective
reports on climate change.12 This organization does not perform any
research or collect any data of its own; rather, it assesses on a
“comprehensive, objective, and transparent basis the latest scientific,
technical, and socio-economic literature produced worldwide
relevant to the understanding of the risk of human-induced climate
change, its observed and projected impacts and options for
adaptation and mitigation.”13
The IPCC is a scientific intergovernmental body created by the
World Meteorological Organization (“WMO”) and the United
Nations Environment Programme (“UNEP”). It consists of, and is
open to, all nations that are members of these two organizations, as
well as hundreds of scientists from all over the world who are chosen

10. Gary Bryner, Reducing Greenhouse Gases Through Carbon Market, 85 DENV. U. L.
REV. 961, 961 (2008).
11. Id. Some of the individual reports are unreliable because of their bias, exemplified by
the reports spawned by corporate groups with ulterior motives. “Exxon Mobile, for example,
has led a long-running campaign designed to mislead the public about the threats of climate
change.” Jonathan Zasloff, The Judicial Carbon Tax: Reconstructing Public Nuisance and
Climate Change, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1827, 1882 n.276 (2008). A memo outlying the
company’s strategy illustrates this point. The memo stated that “[v]ictory will be achieved
when uncertainties in climate science become part of the conventional wisdom.” Id. (quoting
Environmental Defense, Too Slick: Stop Exxon Mobile’s Global Misinformation Campaign,
http://action.environmentaldefense.org/EDF_Action_Network/alertdescription.html?alert_i
d=244798).
12. http://www.ipcc.ch/organization.htm
13. Id.
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by their governments to provide pro bono work as authors,
contributors, and reviewers.14
The IPCC has taken the position that it is “‘likely’ or ‘very likely’
that anthropogenic [human-caused] increases in greenhouse gases
are causing climate change, and that climate change will have
significant effects.”15 Experts believe that climate change is due in
large part to the growth in carbon dioxide emissions—the
predominant anthropogenic gas.16 Although the world has seen
increases in the emissions of greenhouse gases since pre-industrial
times, the most notable changes occurred over the past forty years.
In 2004, for example, carbon dioxide emissions were eighty percent
higher than in 1970. The most dramatic increase occurred during
the last decade due in large part to increases in the consumption of
fossil fuels.17 Furthermore, in 2005, the level of carbon dioxide in
the atmosphere overwhelmingly surpassed levels that have existed for
650,000 years.18
The growth in anthropogenic gases has led to the warming of
the earth’s climate system. Over the past fifty years—when the largest
growth in levels of carbon dioxide occurred—the rate of temperature
increases has nearly doubled from levels seen during the prior fifty
year period.19 The last two decades have also seen some of the
warmest recorded temperatures. For example, the average Northern
Hemisphere temperatures from 1950–2000 were “very likely higher
than during any other [fifty]-year period in the last 500 years and
likely the highest in at least the past 1300 years.”20
The IPCC believes that rising temperatures are the cause of the
consistent increase in sea levels over the past fifty years, as well as
decreases in arctic ice, mountain glaciers, and snow cover.21 Even

14. Id.; see Bryner, supra note 10.
15. Zasloff, supra note 11, at 1870.
16. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007
SYNTHESIS REPORT 36 (2007) [hereinafter SYNTHESIS REPORT], available at http://www.
ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf (“[Carbon dioxide] represented 77% of
total anthropogenic [greenhouse gas emissions] in 2004.”).
17. Id. at 36–37.
18. Id. at 37.
19. Id. at 30.
20. Id. Although global temperatures have increased, the effect is not uniform; the
greatest increases are found around the North Pole. Id. The Arctic’s temperature has increased
nearly twice as much as the global average rate. Id.
21. Id.
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though some regions have seen significant increases in precipitation
since 1990, droughts are more prevalent and affect more regions
than they did forty years ago.22 Some argue that the effects of climate
change are minute and that it is only a future problem; its effects,
however, are already visible. Changed temperatures, for example, are
already causing severe weather patterns. The tropical cyclone
Hurricane Katrina exemplifies the potential physical and economic
consequences natural disasters pose. Increased temperatures are also
impacting the earth’s physical and biological systems:23 it is predicted
that “global warming will eliminate 15–37 percent of the species
now on the planet.”24
The problem with climate change is that to combat its effects,
significant change is required. Current regulations do little to slow
the effects of climate change, and carbon emissions will likely
continue to grow.25 Moreover, the carbon dioxide that is already
present in our atmosphere will continue to contribute to global
warming for centuries to come because carbon cannot readily be
removed from the atmosphere.26 This indicates that temperatures
may continue to increase despite valiant efforts to curb future
emissions.
Because increases in the earth’s temperature will likely occur,
efforts to stop global warming are futile. But even though it is
impossible to stop, the world can slow global warming to mitigate its
effects. Scientists, in general, have concluded the increase in global
temperature should be limited to two degrees Centigrade to mitigate
the damage that global warming will cause.27 To accomplish this, the

22. Id.
23. Id. at 31.
24. Pierce, supra note 2, at 598.
25. SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 16, at 44.
26. See id. at 47. For example, about one-half of the carbon dioxide released in the year
1907 is present in today’s atmosphere. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1579. Even if it
were possible to eradicate our current carbon emissions, in 2107 ninety percent of these
emissions would linger in the atmosphere. Id.
27. Bryner, supra note 10, at 965. Scientists fear that
if the average temperature increases by more than two degrees Centigrade . . . the
planet would enter into uncharted waters, where the temperature would be hotter
than it has been for hundreds of thousands of years and would create an
environment much different than the one in which current life has evolved.
Id.
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world’s current emissions rates need to be reduced by sixty to eighty
percent of 1990 levels by the year 2050.28
III. THE FIRST STEP ON THE ROAD TO RECOVERY IS ADMITTING
THAT YOU HAVE A PROBLEM
With many preeminent scientists in agreement that carbon
emissions are causing our earth’s temperature to rise and that this
change will have significant impacts, it seems surprising that the
United States has heretofore been reluctant to address this issue.29
When one examines the situation, however, several factors become
apparent that explain why, until recently, the United States has
declined to admit that there is a problem: the United States is the
world’s largest contributor to greenhouse gas emissions, the United
States may actually stand to benefit economically from global
warming, and proposals to address climate change receive opposition
from constituencies on both the right and the left of the political
spectrum. Despite these hurdles, the United States should actively
promote a policy to reduce its, and the world’s, greenhouse gas
emissions.
A. Contributors to Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Greenhouse gases, unlike some other
challenging because they pose threats not
they are emitted, but also to the rest of
carbon dioxide—the major contributor

pollutants, are especially
only to the locale where
the world. For example,
to global warming30—

28. Id.
29. The United States, for example, failed to join international collaborative efforts to
curb greenhouse emissions when it refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol—an international
agreement which required its member states to reduce emissions to 5% below 1990 levels.
Joshua P. Fershee, Levels of Green: State and Regional Efforts, in Wyoming and Beyond, to
Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 7 WYO. L. REV. 269, 276 (2007); see also United Nations,
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1998, at 3 art.
3, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng/pdf. The United States has
also paid little attention to climate change domestically. Fershee, supra, at 270 n.5 (quoting
Peter Baker & Steven Mufson, Bush’s Climate Remarks Weighted for Policy Shift, WASH. POST,
Jan. 27, 2007, at A1) (“[T]he 2007 State of the Union address was ‘the first time in Bush’s six
years in office that he mentioned [climate change] in a State of the Union.’”).
30. Michael P. Vandenbergh & Brooke A. Ackerly, Climate Change: The Equity
Problem, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 55, 58 (2008); see also Federico Cheever, Everyone Complains
About the Weather, but No One Ever Does Anything About It: Interjurisdictional Failure to
Designate Responsible Parties for the Climate Crisis, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 765, 777 (2008)
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emitted in the United States would have just as great an impact on
increases in global temperature as would the same proportion of
carbon dioxide emitted in Thailand; regardless of locale, emissions
are all trapped in the same atmospheric bubble.31 Thus, because of
carbon emissions’ worldwide effect, it is reasonable to assume that
those nations who historically and currently emit the most carbon
dioxide would oppose efforts to reduce emissions. The rationale for
their opposition is twofold: (1) admitting that global warming is a
problem may result in penalties for those countries who contributed
the most to the current carbon emissions stockpile, and (2) it is
reasonable to estimate that those nations who are the largest
polluters will bear the heaviest cost to reduce their emissions.32
Table 1 illustrates the largest emitters of carbon dioxide as of
2004.
TABLE 1. “SHARE OF GLOBAL EMISSIONS, 2003 AND 2004”33
United States
Europe34
China
India
Japan
Africa
Russia

2003
22.7%
16.9%
15.3%
4.1%
4.9%
3.5%
4.2%

2004
22.0%
16.3%
17.5%
4.1%
4.7%
3.4%
4.2%

The United States, which had “long led the world in greenhouse
gas emissions,”35 was the largest emitter in 2004, followed by China
(“Carbon dioxide constituted 84.6 percent of greenhouse gases emitted in the United
States.”).
31. Rose, supra note 7, at 106.
32. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1567, 1576–77.
33. Id. at 1577 (referring to DEP’T OF ENERGY, INT’L ENERGY OUTLOOK, DOE/EIA0484, 81 tbl.A8 (2007), www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/index.html).
34. Posner and Sunstein’s measurements for Europe refer to only those European
nations that are part of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(“OECD”). Id. at 1577 n.67. The following European countries are members of OECD:
Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak
Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. Id. (citing OECD,
Members and Partners,
http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3147,en_36734052_36761800_
1_1_1_1_1,00.html).
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and Europe. China, in 2007, supplanted the United States as the
world’s leading emitter of greenhouse gases.36 It is therefore
unsurprising that both China and the United States have not
accepted a proposal to limit their carbon emissions.37 What may be
surprising is that Europe, the third leading emitter of carbon
dioxide, has accepted a proposal to limit its carbon output.38 Perhaps
Europe’s acceptance of such a proposal can be explained by the fact
that its carbon emissions were already decreasing before it signed the
agreement. This is illustrated in Table 2.
TABLE 2. “RELATIVE CONTRIBUTIONS OF ANNUAL CARBON
DIOXIDE EMISSIONS BY COUNTRY/REGION (APPROXIMATE
PERCENTAGE OF WORLDWIDE EMISSIONS)”39
U.S.
Europe
China
India
Japan
Africa

1990
23.5%
19.3%
10.5%
2.7%
4.8%
3.1%

2003
22.7%
16.9%
15.3%
4.1%
4.9%
3.5%

2004
22.0%
16.3%
17.5%
4.1%
4.7%
3.4%

2010
20.1%
14.6%
21.1%
4.2%
4.1%
3.7%

2015
19.4%
13.4%
22.4%
4.4%
3.8%
3.8%

2020
18.8%
12.4%
23.9%
4.7%
3.5%
3.9%

2025
18.7%
11.6%
25.0%
4.9%
3.3%
3.9%

2030
18.5%
10.9%
26.2%
5.0%
3.0%
3.9%

The United States and China are both projected to maintain
their position as the world’s leading emitters; however, China’s
proportion of global emissions is expected to be substantially greater
than the United States’ by 2030.40 This is due in large part to the
explosive growth in China’s emissions over the past two decades
compared to the rest of the world.41

35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 1567.
Id. at 1579.
Id. at 1567.
The European Union’s carbon marketplace opened in 2005. EUROPA, EMISSION
TRADING SYSTEM (2009), http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/index_en.
htm.
39. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1578.
40. Id.
41. See id. at 1578–79.
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TABLE 3. “CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS CHANGES, 1990–2004”42
China
United States
India
Russia

1990–2004
108.3%
19.8%
87.5%
-24.8%

Thus, if the United States and China emit as projected, they will
continue to potentially place their own populations, as well as other
nations, at risk to the negative impacts of climate change.43
B. Disparate Impact of Global Warming
The United States’ hesitance to address climate change can
further be explained by the fact that scientists predict that the
American economy will remain relatively unaffected by increases in
the earth’s temperature.44 Estimates prepared by two Yale economists
indicate that global warming will not uniformly affect the world’s
nations, at least in terms of Gross Domestic Product.45 Nordhaus
predicts that “annual global output” will likely be reduced by 3%—
which would have enormous consequences—while Mendelsohn
predicts the United States’ annual output would only be reduced by
a negligible .03%.46 The lesson to be drawn from this analysis is that
while the cause of climate change is not proportionally distributed,
neither are its consequences.47
The United States, which has contributed the most to the
existing stockpile of carbon in our atmosphere, would remain
relatively unaffected economically by climate change and may in fact
experience small gains.48 China, the current leader in emissions, and
Russia would also stand to profit from climate change. Both of these

42. Id. at 1578.
43. See id. at 1567.
44. Id. at 1581–82.
45. Pierce, supra note 2, at 597.
46. Id.
47. See Cheever, supra note 30, at 771 (“[A]lthough wealthy countries are responsible
for most of the accumulated greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, they will . . . face less
damage than poor countries.” (quoting Sujatha Byravan & Sudhir Chella Rahan, Immigration
Could Ease Climate-Change Impact, 434 NATURE 435, Mar. 24, 2005)).
48. Pierce, supra note 2, at 598.
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nations are expected to benefit from increased agricultural
production due to warmer temperatures.49 Nevertheless, despite
overall gains, some regions within these nations would be
detrimentally affected. States in the American southwest, such as
Oklahoma, would likely not benefit from increased temperatures and
may, in fact, be adversely affected due to drought.50
In addition to the United States and China, the world’s most
affluent nations are the most protected from the effects of climate
change.51 Three reasons have been posited why these nations will
fare better. First, they are more capable of adapting.52 These nations
have the resources to implement new technology to cope with global
warming. Second, the strength of their economies is not reliant on
agricultural output.53 This should be contrasted with the agricultural
economies of India and Africa. These nations are generally regarded
to be the biggest losers in regards to climate change and are
expected to suffer significant losses in agriculture and health.54
India’s agricultural economy, in particular, would suffer significant
losses from climatic changes to the monsoon, on which it relies for
agricultural production.55 Third, the wealthiest nations are less
vulnerable to temperature increases because they are located in
“cooler, higher latitudes.”56 Thus, some increases in temperature are
likely to substantially benefit nations with traditionally cooler
temperatures, such as Russia and Canada. A rise in temperatures
would not only increase Russia’s agricultural production, but it
would also significantly reduce heating costs.57
C. Global Warming: A Catch-22
If the wealthiest nations fail to address climate change, the
poorest nations, which contribute the least to the supposed causes of

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
1580–81.
55.
56.
57.
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Posner & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1580.
Id.
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DO NOT DELETE

1379

11/20/2009 10:45 AM

Designing an Effective Cap-and-Trade Program

global warming, would be most affected.58 But if the United States
takes steps to reduce its carbon output through the imposition of
environmental regulations, the resulting increase in prices would be
passed on to consumers.59 Some observers have claimed that any
efforts to reduce emissions in the United States, as well as the world,
are elitist and push down poor people.60 Because of the possible
disparate impact on poor people, opponents of legislation to stop
climate change can appeal to both conservatives and liberals.61
Accordingly, global warming is in essence a Catch-22, where we are
essentially “damned if we do” and “damned if we don’t” take steps
to successfully reduce carbon output.
D. The United States Needs to Act
Although, as previously stated, there are several reasons why the
United States would not want to take regulatory measures to reduce
its carbon emissions, it should implement a reduction policy and
choose a method that could be implemented by the rest of the
world. Such a plan could benefit the United States in helping the
country (1) mitigate the negative environmental impacts of climate
change, (2) maintain its leading economic and political position in
the world, and (3) uphold its standing as a world leader.
Even assuming that the United States will not be as adversely
affected economically as other nations by climate change, global
warming still poses significant environmental risks. For example,
global warming has been linked to natural disasters. Hurricane
Katrina demonstrated the United States’ vulnerability to tropical
cyclones and the heavy human and economic costs associated with
these storms.62 The United States has significant coastlines and
valuable property that will be affected by tropical storms and rising
ocean levels. 63 Prolonged and more severe droughts in the American
southwest also pose significant threats to the U.S. water supply.64

58. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1580–82.
59. See Vandenbergh & Ackerly, supra note 30, at 55.
60. See Robert Hardaway, Carbon Markets in Context: Into Which Component of
Holdren’s Equation Do They Fit?, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 983, 986–87 (2008).
61. See Vandenbergh & Ackerly, supra note 30, at 60–62.
62. See Louise K. Comfort, Cities at Risk: Hurricane Katrina and the Drowning of New
Orleans, 41 URB. AFF. R. 501, 507 (2006).
63. See Zasloff, supra note 11, at 1841.
64. Id.
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In addition to environmental concerns, the United States would
benefit economically from carbon regulation. As of 2008, the
international market for the right to emit carbon was valued at $64
billion, an astounding number when compared to its relatively
humble beginnings—$200 million—in 2003.65 The growth of the
international market for carbon is largely due to the development of
the European Union’s Trading System, which accounts for sixty-five
percent of the market.66 Currently the United States, the leading
contributor to the existing stockpile of greenhouse gases, is only a
nominal player in the global carbon market.67 This is largely due to
the fact that the U.S. market is primarily driven by voluntary
participation, as opposed to Europe’s mandatory participation as a
signatory of the Kyoto Protocol.68 “Now, with everyone from
PepsiCo to Google to Pearl Jam striving to offset their carbon
footprints, placing a value on carbon reduction has become
commonplace.”69 The United States needs to take advantage of this
growing market and design its own mandatory participation system.
In order to maintain its political clout throughout the next
century, the United States needs to reduce its emissions and
encourage the world to do so as well. Though observers project that
the U.S. economy will fare better than most nations, these same
observers expect China and Russia—two of its major political and
economic rivals—to fare even better.70 The United States needs to
do what is within its power to proactively address this concern.
Regulating carbon emissions and creating a system that would
encourage world participation is one effective method of achieving
this goal. Not only would the United States maintain its political
position by spearheading this program, but it would also mitigate the
substantial economic benefits that China and Russia would derive
from climate change. The United States needs to lead the world in
reducing carbon emissions because it is unlikely that either China or
other developing nations—whose per capita rate of emissions are

65. Ann Grodnik & Radha Kuppalli, Investors Willing to Bet U.S. Carbon Market Has
Legs, THE BOND BUYER, Nov. 17, 2008, at 29.
66. Id.
67. Id. (“The 2007 value of the U.S. carbon market was $331 million, or 0.5% of the
global market.”).
68. See id.
69. Id.
70. See supra Part III.B.
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much lower than the United States’—would participate unless it
leads the way.71
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS: CARBON TAX VERSUS CAP-AND-TRADE
There is a growing adherence to the prediction that if the world
chooses to lower greenhouse gases it would do so through either a
tax on the carbon content of fuels or a carbon cap-and-trade
system.72 The majority of economists argue that a “price-based
regulatory system”—such as a carbon tax—is preferable to a
quantity-based scheme like cap-and-trade;73 however, it is unlikely
that the world, and the United States especially, would choose a tax
over other regulatory approaches.74
A. Carbon Tax
A carbon tax is a tax on fuels that emit high levels of carbon
dioxide.75 Despite widespread support from economists,76 few
politicians favor this approach.77 This is surprising because—when
compared to other regulatory proposals—a carbon tax offers
numerous advantages: it forces fuels to reflect their negative impact
on the environment,78 it encourages technological innovation,79 its
revenue can be used to reduce other taxes,80 and it is easy to
administer.81 That said, the lack of political support for carbon taxes
makes them an unlikely solution to global warming.
The most common rationale for imposing carbon taxes on fossil
fuels is that their current price does not accurately reflect the costs
71. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1576 n.61.
72. Id. at 1574.
73. See Zasloff, supra note 11, at 1842.
74. See Cheever, supra note 30, at 768 (noting that cap-and-trade is the most discussed
and probable legislative solution to greenhouse gas emissions).
75. Zimmer, supra note 9, at 67.
76. See Zasloff, supra note 11, at 1842.
77. See Cheever, supra note 30, at 779–80 (citing Victor B. Flatt, Taking the Legislative
Temperature: Which Federal Climate Change Legislative Proposal Is “Best”?, 102 NW. U. L.
REV. 123, 123, 135 (2007), available at http://colloquy.law.northwestern.edu
/main/2007/12/taking-the-legi.html).
78. See Zimmer, supra note 9, at 67 (noting that a carbon tax is a tax on the carbon
emissions produced by burning a fossil fuel).
79. Bryner, supra note 10, at 968; see Hardaway, supra note 60, at 991.
80. Pierce, supra note 2, at 601.
81. Id. at 600–01.
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and damages (“externalities”) associated with their consumption.82
Proponents of these taxes would argue, for example, that the cost of
gas does not adequately account for the harm associated with the
carbon dioxide emissions that are released when it is burned or
reflect the effect this pollution has on physical health.83 The levy of a
carbon tax would force such fuels to accurately represent these costs,
and consumers, in turn, would demand cleaner products to replace
the high-cost carbon-rich fuels.84 This corollary to a carbon tax—the
effect on consumers—is imperative to the success of any regulatory
plan because individual behavior accounts for a significant portion of
U.S. carbon emissions.85
If the carbon tax were set at the right level, it would also provide
businesses with incentives to innovate.86 Regulatory proposals that
set emissions standards on vehicles provide little incentive to design a
vehicle that performs substantially below the proscribed emissions
rate.87 Companies faced with carbon taxes, by contrast, would
continually seek to develop more efficient products to decrease their
tax burden and, in turn, increase profits.88
Another significant benefit derived from carbon taxes is the new
tax revenue it would generate; this could be used for several different
purposes, including paying down the federal deficit.89 Liberals and
conservatives alike are concerned with the United States’ increasing
deficit. Several agencies within the federal government have also
acknowledged this serious problem.90 A carbon tax can be specifically
crafted to address this concern, and it is arguably a superior
alternative to the political firestorm that would result from an
82. Zimmer, supra note 9, at 67.
83. See id.
84. Id.
85. See Vandenbergh & Ackerly, supra note 30, at 59–60 (estimating that 4.1 trillion
pounds, or roughly thirty-two percent, of carbon dioxide in the United States in the year 2000
was attributable to individual behavior).
86. See Bryner, supra note 10, at 968.
87. Id. (noting that taxes, as opposed to emissions standards, provide a continuous
incentive to innovate).
88. See Zimmer, supra note 9, at 67.
89. See Westerfield, supra note 3, at 181 (noting that carbon tax revenues could be used
to reduce other pre-existing taxes).
90. Pierce, supra note 2, at 601 (“The Federal Reserve Board has identified . . . [the
U.S.] budget deficit as . . . [the nation’s] most serious long-term economic problem.” (citing
Associated Press, Bernanke Warns of ‘Vicious Cycle’ in Deficits, MSNBC.COM, Jan. 18, 2007,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/16688089/)).
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increase in income taxes and reduced spending by the federal
government to decrease the deficit.91
Imposition of a carbon tax could also be used to offset or lower
current federal taxes to minimize any possible negative economic
consequences.92 Because of its relative simplicity, the tax could be
evaluated periodically and adjusted to compensate businesses and
social groups who are unduly injured by the tax.93
A carbon tax is also one of the most effective regulatory
approaches in providing stability and price predictability to the
market.94 The tax would set the price of carbon, which would allow
manufacturers and consumers to make energy-informed decisions
about their future consumption in advance.95 This predictability
provides stability to the market. A lack of stability is one of the
serious grievances cited by businesses in the United Kingdom, which
are regulated by a cap-and-trade system.96 Nearly two-thirds of all
companies in the United Kingdom are dissatisfied with the
unpredictable cap-and-trade market and would prefer a carbon tax.97
Perhaps the overwhelming factor for this preference is their inability
to make future financial plans on their business’s future energy
costs.98
Carbon taxes also better address timeliness and corruption
concerns than would a cap-and-trade approach. The timeliness of a
carbon tax is attractive because, if approved by Congress and the
President, it could go into effect immediately.99 Additionally, the tax
would likely be less susceptible to bureaucratic manipulation; it is not

91. See id. at 600–01.
92. Zimmer, supra note 9, at 69; see Westerfield, supra note 3, at 181; see also Fershee,
supra note 29, at 290 (commenting that Al Gore, an advocate of carbon taxes, “suggested
using a carbon tax in place of some payroll taxes”).
93. See Zimmer, supra note 9, at 69.
94. Id. at 68.
95. Id.
96. See id. (“Over fifty percent of U.K. companies today are struggling with long-term
strategic and business . . . decisions in the face of the current unstable policy and tax
environment.”).
97. Id. (“[S]ixty-six percent of U.K. companies welcome the use of the tax system to
provide incentives for them to become carbon neutral.”).
98. Id. at 67–68. Market instability from cap-and-trade is not unique to the United
Kingdom. In the United States, for example, “tradable permits [for sulfur dioxide] have varied
in price by over forty percent.” Id.
99. Id. at 68.
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allocated and it would apply to everyone.100 This removes the
possibility of companies and individuals illegally paying for the right
to receive extra allocations.
Another benefit of the carbon tax is that it avoids some of the
administrative difficulties that would likely be posed by the
implementation of a cap-and-trade system.101 The tax is relatively
simple to administer. “The carbon content of every form of fossil
fuel is precisely known, as is the amount of [carbon dioxide] released
when that fuel is burned.”102 And most businesses monitor their
consumption of fuel.103 These factors would make the tax relatively
simple to fit into our current tax system.104 Although a carbon tax
may require a substantial reconstruction of the environmental and
energy sections in the tax code,105 it is less abstract and more
straightforward than cap-and-trade.106
Unfortunately, its relative simplicity also makes it unpalatable.
Because the carbon tax would be relatively clear and easy to
understand, the public could readily see how such a tax would affect
them.107 Any opposition would make it difficult to impose such a tax.
One illustration of this difficulty is President Clinton’s failed attempt
to introduce a carbon tax. His proposal to introduce a relatively
small tax on hydrocarbons was immediately rejected.108 Thus, the
transparency of the carbon tax makes it unlikely to gain support of
politicians, especially when today’s carbon tax would likely have to
be much larger than the small hydrocarbon tax proposed by
President Clinton.109 Politicians’ fear of proposing a carbon tax is

100. Zasloff, supra note 11, at 1842.
101. See Pierce, supra note 2, at 600–01 (noting the difficulty in global coordination of
appropriate cap-and-trade baselines, price volatility, increased transactions costs, and potential
corruption as consequences of a global cap-and-trade program).
102. Zimmer, supra note 9, at 68 (citing Carbon Tax Center, Introduction, http://
www.carbontax.org/introduction/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2009)).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 67.
105. Id. at 70.
106. Bryner, supra note 10, at 968.
107. Zimmer, supra note 9, at 69.
108. Pierce, supra note 2, at 601 (“When President Clinton attempted to persuade
Congress to enact a [carbon tax] . . . his proposal was pronounced dead on arrival in the
Senate.” (citing Steven Greenhouse, Moynihan Predicts a Deal on Bigger Energy Tax, N.Y.
TIMES, July 12, 1993, at A18)).
109. Id. at 601–02 (noting that an effective carbon tax would have to be twenty times
larger than President Clinton’s proposed tax).
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further illustrated by the fact that there are relatively few carbon tax
proposals,110 and most notably, the U.S. House of Representatives
recently opted to pass a bill that provides for carbon cap-andtrade.111
B. Cap-and-Trade
Cap-and-trade is touted as the market-based solution to limit
carbon emissions,112 and likely will be the approach that the United
States adopts to combat climate change. Many American officials
prefer this market-based method,113 and President Obama has
advocated a cap-and-trade system and outlined a rudimentary plan to
reduce carbon emissions through cap-and-trade in his 2009
Budget.114
Cap-and-trade limits pollution to a specific level (the “cap”) and
distributes the right to pollute to those regulated under the cap.115
These rights may be traded; thus, the system’s goals are met through
limiting pollution to one’s allocable share or by purchasing rights116
to exceed the allowance from those who are below their individual
cap.117 It is important to note that although allocations may be
traded, the cap remains fixed.118 The effect of a cap-and-trade is that
it incentivizes participants to decrease their emissions so that they
may realize the gains that may be achieved in selling rights to
pollute.119 It is important that the cap is set sufficiently low so that

110. See Cheever, supra note 30, at 779–80 (citing Victor B. Flatt, Taking the Legislative
Temperature: Which Federal Climate Change Legislative Proposal Is “Best”?, 102 NW. U. L.
REV. 123, 123, 135 (2007), available at http://colloquy.law.northwestern.edu/main/2007/
12/taking-the-legi.html).
111. See H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. §§ 701–05 (2009).
112. Tseming Yang, The Problem of Maintaining Emission “Caps” in Carbon Trading
Programs Without Federal Government Involvement: A Brief Examination of the Chicago
Climate Exchange and the Northeast Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 17 FORDHAM ENVTL.
L. REV. 271, 272 (2006).
113. Rose, supra note 7, at 92–93.
114. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 1, at 21, 100.
115. See Rose, supra note 7, at 91–92; see also Yang, supra note 112, at 272–73.
116. It is important to note that what is allocated under a carbon cap-and-trade is not
physical, but rather, it is the right to emit greenhouse gases. See Jillian Button, Note, Carbon:
Commodity or Currency? The Case for an International Carbon Market Based on the Currency
Model, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 571, 571 (2008).
117. Hardaway, supra note 60, at 990–91; see also Yang, supra note 112, at 273.
118. Rose, supra note 7, at 92.
119. Yang, supra note 112, at 273.
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those regulated will need to trade in order to comply with the
regulations.
Cap-and-trade schemes are most successful when used to reduce
prevalent, continuous problems rather than specific instances of
pollution.120 A cap on carbon would address this concern because
scientists believe it is the primary pollutant causing global warming.
Further, cap-and-trade is most effective when the price of reducing
emissions is not uniform across sources and there is a regulated
market where those who can reduce their emissions at a cheaper cost
can sell their extra allowances on the market.121
Although this method is just one of the available approaches to
reduce emissions,122 it is the method that Congress will most likely
support.123 A plethora of both voluntary124 and mandatory125 capand-trade systems in both the domestic126 and international127
markets currently exist; however, the two most well-known programs
are the U.S. Acid Rain Market and the European Emissions Trading
System.128
The U.S. Acid Rain Market, on which the Kyoto Protocol and
many subsequent cap-and-trade models are based, is the best
example of a successful cap-and-trade program.129 This “poster
child” of cap-and-trade came to form in the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments.130 This Act set a cap on the emissions from coal-fired
power plants that were causing acid rain.131 These plants were
deemed to be responsible for ninety-five percent of the sulfur dioxide

120. Westerfield, supra note 3, at 176.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Vandenbergh & Ackerly, supra note 30, at 73.
124. Examples of voluntary programs are the Kyoto Protocol Clean Development
Mechanism and the Chicago Climate Exchange Program. Hardaway, supra note 60, at 991.
125. Examples of pending mandatory programs are the Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative, California Global Warming Solutions Act, and the Climate Stewardship Act. Id.
126. Examples of domestic markets are the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative and
Western Climate Initiative, which also includes Canada. See Button, supra note 116, at 571.
127. Some examples of markets outside of the United States are the European Union’s
Emissions Trading System, United Kingdom’s Emissions Trading System, and New Zealand’s
Emissions Trading Scheme. Id. at 571.
128. Hardaway, supra note 60, at 990.
129. Westerfield, supra note 3, at 177.
130. Rose, supra note 7, at 92.
131. Bryner, supra note 10, at 970.
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in the northeast.132 In 1990 there were high levels of wet-sulfate
deposition—“the predominant component of acid rain”—in the
northeastern United States.133 Relatively quickly, this program
produced sizeable reductions in the levels of wet-sulfate deposition
in this region.134
The program established a cap on the sulfur-dioxide that coalfired power plants could emit. This cap has been lowered over time
to ensure that the environmental goals for reduction will be met.135
The “[c]ap on [the] total emissions projected, by the year 2010, . . .
[was set to decrease] sulfur dioxide emissions [by roughly] ten
million tons from the 1980 levels.”136 In addition to providing clear
guidelines on when the cap would be lowered, the program also
specified from the onset how rights to emit would be allocated.137
Although acid rain is still a problem—wet-sulfate deposition was
reduced, not eliminated138—the U.S. Acid Rain Program is
considered a success. Aside from the fact that the program reduced
acid rain, the program has also been considered a success because it
attained these results at a much lower cost than expected.139
Prognosticators originally believed the program would cost $7 to $8
billion per year; surprisingly, the program only cost $2 billion per
year.140 This is an astounding result because this cost is roughly fifty
percent cheaper than the cost of a command-and-control approach,
which would have created a uniform emissions standard and would
not have permitted trading.141
The success of the U.S. Acid Rain Program catapulted cap-andtrade to the forefront of the discussion on climate change regulatory
methods. Although it should be noted that not all existing cap-andtrade programs have successfully reduced emissions,142 the cap-andtrade on sulfur dioxide “dramatically reduced acid rain at much
132. Westerfield, supra note 3, at 176.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 177.
135. Id. at 176.
136. Bryner, supra note 10, at 970.
137. Westerfield, supra note 3, at 176.
138. See Bryner, supra note 10, at 971.
139. Westerfield, supra note 3, at 177.
140. Id.
141. Button, supra note 116, at 580.
142. For example, the European cap-and-trade is regarded as having failed to reduce
carbon emissions. See Zasloff, supra note 11, at 1842; see also Zimmer, supra note 9, at 68.
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lower costs than the traditional government regulations and
mandates of the past.”143 This program’s success has led to
speculation that a global carbon market could significantly lower the
cost of greenhouse gas emissions reductions.144
Part of the reason politicians support cap-and-trade, as opposed
to a carbon tax, is that the global carbon credit market has
experienced tremendous growth.145 In the two years after the Kyoto
Protocol went into effect (2005 to 2006) the global marketplace for
carbon credits—the tradable unit of carbon under a cap-and-trade
system—reached an annual value of over $30 billion.146 Experts
expect that this market will continue to grow: its estimated value by
the year 2020 is predicted to be $144 billion U.S. dollars, which
“represents approximately one-fifth of the current total value of
global trade in fuels.”147
The existence of an international market for carbon is one of the
major selling points for cap-and-trade. To successfully limit carbon
emissions, any effort must be on a global scale and involve the
United States, the European nations, India, China, and other major
countries.148 If the United States unilaterally committed to an effort
to reduce carbon emissions, its efforts would be negligible on global
warming by the year 2100.149 Thus, a U.S. cap-and-trade system is
popular because there is the possibility that it can function on an
international level.150

143. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 1, at 21, 100; see Button, supra note
116, at 580 (commenting that the success of the Acid Rain Program showed that it may be
possible to reduce carbon emissions “up to fifty percent more cheaply than under a commandand-control approach”); see also Bryner, supra note 10, at 969.
144. Button, supra note 116, at 580.
145. Christopher Carr & Flavia Rosembuj, Flexible Mechanisms for Climate Change
Compliance: Emission Offset Purchases Under the Clean Development Mechanism, 16 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 44, 51 (2008).
146. Id. at 44, 51.
147. Button, supra note 116, at 591.
148. Pierce, supra note 2, at 600.
149. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1576 (explaining that because the Kyoto
Protocol did not place any restrictions on developing nations, “[f]ull compliance with the
Kyoto Protocol would have reduced global warming by merely 0.03°C by 2100”).
150. See Bryner, supra note 10, at 969; Button, supra note 116, at 571–72 (stating that
the International Carbon Action Partnership (ICAP), a forum for existing and new
governments looking to establish cap-and-trade programs, was established on October 29,
2007, and that the European Union is encouraging governments outside of the EU to link to
their market).
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Cap-and-trade will also provide incentives for companies to
innovate and develop new technology to reduce carbon emissions.151
Additionally, the emission allowances may be sold in an auction, the
proceeds, of which, can fund alternative energy projects.152 The use
of these proceeds for clean energy, combined with the possibility
that the carbon market could produce up to $100 billion annually
for investment in poor nations,153 could serve the ultimate goal of
reducing emissions.
A notable characteristic of a cap-and-trade system is that the
“future emission targets for reductions are fixed and known.”154 This
emphasizes emission reduction rather than economic stabilization.155
Thus, “[i]f accurately set, the cap ensures environmental protection
goals are achieved . . . .”156
The most important attribute of cap-and-trade, however, is that
it is politically feasible. Unlike carbon taxes, a cap-and-trade program
would not be plagued with the heightened opposition that proposals
for higher taxes receive.157 Even though cap-and-trade creates a cost
penalty charge much like a carbon tax, policymakers prefer it because
it avoids the “T” word.158 Furthermore, the industrial constituencies
of elected officials often prefer the idea of a cap-and-trade system
because there is the possibility that this system will allocate free
allowances.159
Cap-and-trade is also advantageous because it shifts the
discussion from who is actually responsible for climate change to
what we should do about it.160 Any discussion about who is
responsible would ultimately be detrimental to the United States, the
largest contributor to the atmospheric greenhouse gas stockpile. The
ability of cap-and-trade to shift the discussion on responsibility
illustrates that the details involved in a cap-and-trade regulatory plan
could get muddled, obscuring what is really going on. This can lead

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

See Hardaway, supra note 60, at 991.
Bryner, supra note 10, at 969.
Carr & Rosembuj, supra note 145, at 51.
Zimmer, supra note 9, at 69.
See Bryner, supra note 10, at 969–70.
Id. at 969.
See id.
Pierce, supra note 2, at 601.
See Bryner, supra note 10, at 970.
See Cheever, supra note 30, at 768.
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to corruption and manipulation,161 especially when oversight will be
subject to reliance on fiduciary duties that have been compromised
in the past and are not currently established on a global level. There
is ample opportunity for self-interested parties to design the system
in a manner that hinders competition or increases their standing
within their respective industries.162 Additionally, in a market system
the reason for price increases can be obscured.163
Even though cap-and-trade has many positive attributes, it is
subject to several criticisms. A cap-and-trade system, for example, is
subject to market fluctuations. The possibility of an unpredictable
carbon market, which leads to uncertain carbon permit pricing,
could make compliance costs difficult to project.164
The most difficult and problematic aspect of a cap-and-trade
system, however, is its administration. For the carbon market,
essentially a whole new market system must be created.165 Cap-andtrade approaches are particularly troublesome because there are
multiple questions to address: the ideal “cap, timing, allowance
allocations, pre-emption, certification procedures, standards for use
of offsets, [and] penalties . . . .”166 These difficulties are further
compounded by the concern that cap-and-trade should be modeled
after the Acid Rain Program—a program that operates on a notably
smaller scale than what is envisioned for a carbon cap-and-trade
system.167
C. Choosing Cap-and-Trade
Even though a carbon tax provides a quick, relatively simple
alternative to reduce carbon emissions, it is not the most feasible
alternative. Its main flaw is that it has relatively little political support
and that much of the world’s attention has focused on a cap-andtrade solution.
161. See Pierce, supra note 2, at 601.
162. See Zimmer, supra note 9, at 69.
163. Id. at 69.
164. See Bryner, supra note 10, at 969; see also Hardaway, supra note 60, at 991; Pierce,
supra note 2, at 600–01.
165. See Zimmer, supra note 9, at 68.
166. Id.; see also Bryner, supra note 10, at 969 (commenting on the difficulty that arises
when too many allocations are made and the uncertainty within which these decisions are
made); Pierce, supra note 2, at 600 (commenting on the difficulty of setting emissions
baselines).
167. Zimmer, supra note 9, at 68.
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Cap-and-trade provides a viable alternative to reducing carbon
emissions because it can be implemented on a global scale and is
promoted widely by elected officials. Because this system will likely
be the model on which the United States and the world seek to
combat climate change, we must pay particular attention to its
construction to ensure its success.
V. DESIGNING AN EFFECTIVE CAP-AND-TRADE
The details of President Obama’s plan to institute a carbon capand-trade system are vague, but it is clear that the administration
intends to develop an economy-wide emissions reduction program
that would reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Although there are
currently several carbon cap-and-trade systems in existence, none of
these have been heralded as a success, and the European system, in
particular, is largely regarded as a failure. Based on their relative lack
of success, it is best to examine the model upon which these systems
are based, the U.S. Acid Rain Program, rather than on its progeny.
The U.S. Acid Rain Program, however, was relatively simple
compared to what will need to be designed for a carbon market, so it
can only serve as a reference point and not the model for a carbon
emissions trading system. Thus, the following are suggestions of
what a carbon market must include in order to meet its defined
environmental goals and alleviate some of the possible collateral
problems relating to its imposition.
Perhaps the most significant aspect that must be kept in mind
when creating a cap-and-trade system is that it must link to other
international systems or be the model for an international cap-andtrade program. This is important because if only the United States
binds itself to significant cutbacks, the effect on global warming by
the year 2100 would be minimal.168 It is likely that any effort to
reduce emissions must not only incorporate the Europeans, but it
must also incorporate China and India to be successful.169 Although
the United States was able to act unilaterally in the fight against acid
rain, the challenges posed by carbon emissions require international
collaboration.170

168. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1576.
169. See Zasloff, supra note 11, at 1830; see also Rose, supra note 7, at 99.
170. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1576.

1401

DO NOT DELETE

11/20/2009 10:45 AM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2009

A. The “Cap”
In President Obama’s 2009 budget he notes that his
administration will work to create an “economy-wide emissions
reduction program to reduce greenhouse gas emissions
approximately 14 percent below 2005 levels by 2020, and
approximately 83 percent below 2005 levels by 2050” through a
cap-and-trade system.171 This brief outline is vague and begs several
questions: First, what does economy-wide mean and which emissions
will be capped? Second, does a reduction of greenhouse gases mean
that all greenhouse gases will be capped, or only carbon, the leading
greenhouse gas? And third, are these reductions enough to reduce or
slow global warming?
To determine which emissions should be capped, it is first
important to determine the origin of the nation’s carbon emissions.
The bulk of carbon dioxide emissions, the leading greenhouse gas in
the United States, come from the generation of energy,
transportation, and industrial sources.172 The remaining carbon
emissions come from “agricultural, commercial, and household
sources.”173 Although the majority of current regulatory proposals
target industrial emitters,174 these regulations may ignore the fact
that individual behavior, including transportation and household
emissions, is responsible for roughly one-third of U.S. carbon
emissions.175 Thus, the majority of proposals seek to influence
individual behavior only indirectly through increased product and
energy prices. There are relatively few proposals that seek to address
individual behavior directly; however, the United Kingdom’s
environment secretary has proposed implementing a “personal
carbon trading” system where citizens in the United Kingdom would

171. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 1, at 100.
172. Bryner, supra note 10, at 966 (commenting that one-third of all emissions come
from the generation of electricity, 28% from transportation, and 19% from industrial sources);
Cheever, supra note 30, at 777 (“Transportation and electrical generation are by far the two
largest sectors, with industry coming in a distant third.”). Some observers suggest that the
electricity sector is responsible for as much as 40% of the carbon dioxide emissions in the
United States. Westerfield, supra note 3, at 180.
173. Bryner, supra note 10, at 966.
174. Vandenbergh & Ackerly, supra note 30, at 58.
175. Id. at 59–60.
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be forced “to pay for their energy-intensive activities by spending
allocated carbon credits.”176
Although current regulations tend to focus entirely on industrial
sources of carbon, a worldwide emissions cap-and-trade program
would likely require a new approach. Perhaps a program that would
address climate change indirectly would be more successful than a
program that seeks to directly regulate individual behavior. This
program would, at least initially, place a cap on the emissions of large
industrial and energy producers. The program, however, would also
seek alternative measures to reduce transportation emissions, such as
emissions requirements on auto producers.
By using an alternative program to address climate change, the
decreasing cap proposed by President Obama could mitigate climate
change—if the United States can convince China to make similar
concessions. The eighty-three percent reduction of 2005 levels by
the year 2050 should sufficiently limit global warming to the two
degrees Centigrade level proposed by climate scientists.177
B. Allowances
There are two main questions that arise with emissions
allocations: First, how to prevent over-allocation? And second, what
method should be used to make these initial allocations?
One concern with the distribution of allowances is that there is a
“natural tendency” to over-allocate.178 To resolve this problem, one
can look to the U.S. Acid Rain Program, which allowed a
governmental agency—the EPA—to “ratchet back” allocations in
the event that Congress granted too many allowances.179 This
ensured that the integrity of the cap was maintained to meet the
environmental goals of the program.180 This type of provision should
be placed in any proposed cap-and-trade system because it would
serve as a safeguard against intentional manipulation as well as the
unintentional results that naturally arise from politicians fighting for
their constituencies.

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Button, supra note 116, at 579.
See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text.
See Westerfield, supra note 3, at 176.
Id.
Id.
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The next concern is how to distribute these allocations—whether
through an auction, free allocation, or some combination of the two.
President Obama proposed that these allocations be given through a
one-hundred percent auction.181 Direct allocations through auctions
are important because they create more certainty; this allows
businesses to make long-term financial decisions.182 Auctions are also
favored by economists and environmentalists because the revenue
generated can be used to further climate change goals, for instance,
by funding alternative energy research.183 Auctions also simplify the
method of allocating allowances:184 those who want them must
purchase them.
Furthermore, an auction also has the potential to raise, annually,
billions of dollars.185 Even a moderate representation of the annual
revenue that the distribution of allowances would generate is
estimated to be $50 to $60 billion per year.186 Because of the high
stakes and high incentives involved, some commentators have
compared the distribution of allowances to the “opening up of the
great American West and the distribution of initial property rights
two centuries ago.”187
Because of the substantial value these allocations would be given
once the government recognized this valuable right to pollute, it is
important that they are not given away. Aside from any possible
unfair practices that could result, free allocation could also lead to
windfall profits for beneficiaries who receive substantially more
allocations than they need.188 Also, it is questionable why these
polluters should receive the benefit of free allocations when it is the
consumer who will ultimately be charged—it is estimated that
consumers would pay eight times more than electric utilities for the
use of the electricity, even after taking into consideration the costs of
complying with a regulatory program, such as cap-and-trade.189 Even
though there may be some advantages in giving allocations as

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
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compensation—to compensate businesses, for example, that are
disproportionately affected by climate regulation or to encourage
technological innovation190—these subsidies may be better obtained
through tax credits.
Besides avoiding the problems mentioned above, an auction
approach could also provide valuable benefits. Cleaner technology,
for instance, could be promoted with auction-generated funds.
President Obama took this approach by proposing to use auction
proceeds to fund $150 billion in clean energy projects over the next
ten years beginning in 2012.191 And, as proposed by President
Obama’s budget, this revenue could be used to serve as a tax break
for the poor and others who would be most detrimentally affected by
the transition to a clean energy economy.192
C. Offsets
It is important to note that this Comment has focused
extensively on the necessity of reducing carbon emissions through
cap-and-trade. A cap-and-trade system, however, would probably
only focus on large energy producers, ignoring many other emitters
of greenhouse gases. In order to reach these carbon emissions, it is
important to allow emitters to meet targets through “carbon
offsets.”193
Emissions offsets are credits that can be earned through projects
and other efforts that reduce greenhouse gases in areas that are not
specifically listed under the cap in a cap-and-trade system.194 Those
who are regulated under the cap can use these extra offsets to meet
their emissions goals or sell them to others who may need them to
satisfy their own obligations under the cap.195
Offsets are generated from a variety of sources, but they are
typically limited to larger endeavors, such as wind farm ventures or
projects to remove the harmful greenhouse gases that escape from

190. Id.
191. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 1, at 21.
192. Id.
193. See DAVID J. HAYES, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, GETTING CREDIT FOR
GOING GREEN 1 (2008), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/03/
pdf/carbon_offsets.pdf.
194. See Carr & Rosembuj, supra note 145, at 52; see also Westerfield, supra note 3, at
186–87.
195. Carr & Rosembuj, supra note 145, at 44–45.
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garbage in landfills.196 Under the current offset system, the majority
of these projects are being performed in China, but over forty-five
countries are currently represented.197
The offset market is voluntary, and some observers characterize it
as uncertain and prone to fraud because of the confusion and lack of
regulation in the market.198 Others also argue that allowing some
entities to meet their emissions goals with offsets reduces the
probability of meeting goals set by the cap.199 This can occur a few
different ways. Individuals, for instance, may purchase offsets instead
of decreasing emissions. An example of this behavior comes from Al
Gore, a proponent of offsets, who defends his high level of
consumption because he buys carbon offsets.200 Critics also argue
that emissions goals would not be met because it can lead to
difficulty in regulating and controlling the offset credits that could
be awarded.201 Under the Kyoto Protocol, there have been reports
that officials in China are lowering the requirements for offset
projects and are awarding credits to marginal endeavors.202 Further,
under Kyoto, there are complaints that industries are awarded offsets
at very low costs and are ignoring needed changes.203
Despite these challenges, there are many benefits that could
accrue from the inclusion of carbon offsets in a cap-and-trade system.
The primary benefit is that they could enable cap-and-trade to
benefit sectors that are not under the cap, such as forestry and
agricultural endeavors.204 This could be highly beneficial because
some of the areas that are unlikely to be included under the cap
contribute heavily to the greenhouse gas stockpile—tropical
deforestation, for example, is estimated to account for twentypercent of global emissions.205

196. Vandenbergh & Ackerly, supra note 30, at 65–66.
197. Carr & Rosembuj, supra note 145, at 53.
198. See HAYES, supra note 193, at 1, 7–8.
199. Id. at 15.
200. See Hardaway, supra note 60, at 986–87. Al Gore was criticized because he
encouraged others to decrease their consumption while he continued to heat his large home
and take private flights. Id. at 987.
201. See HAYES, supra note 193, at 7–8, 14.
202. Id. at 10.
203. Id. at 1 (citing David G. Victor & Danny Cullenward, Making Carbon Markets
Work, SCI. AM., Dec. 2007, at 75–76).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 13.
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Offsets also provide a way for individuals to combat global
warming. This is best exemplified by the growth in the voluntary
carbon offset market. In 2004, this market was valued at
approximately $6 million.206 In a mere two years, the market was in
excess of $110 million.207 The voluntary carbon offset market is
taking off, and there are more opportunities for individuals to
participate every day. The vast potential of this important market can
lead individuals to support corporate and government actions that
would reduce greenhouse emissions.
Because there is a possibility of abuse, it is important to establish
procedures and verification of the actions that earn offset credits.
Companies should not be able to circumvent their responsibility to
comply under the cap by purchasing offsets. Rather, there should be
a limit on the maximum amount of offsets they are able to produce.
For example, under the Lieberman-Warner bill—a cap-and-trade
proposal—regulated entities could only use offsets to reduce their
commitment under the cap by fifteen percent.208
D. Carbon as a Currency
The key to a cap-and-trade system providing a reprieve from
global warming is its ability to reduce global emissions of greenhouse
gases. In order to ensure its success, it must be designed to integrate
other cap-and-trade systems that reduce emissions on a global scale.
This is difficult because the current carbon markets are insular: the
new tradable units that are created are not yet recognized and are
not freely exchangeable in other markets.209 These factors make
global convergence of cap-and-trade systems problematic. To
encourage the establishment of other systems and the exchange of
credits internationally, the issue of what legal characteristic carbon
credits will possess must be determined from the outset so that this
definition can be uniformly applied on a global scale.210
Although the unit of exchange for carbon in all markets is
relatively uniform—it represents the right to emit greenhouse gas
206. Vandenbergh & Ackerly, supra note 30, at 67 (citing James Kanter, Guilt-Free
Pollution. Or Is It?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2007, at C1).
207. Id. (citing James Kanter, Guilt-Free Pollution. Or Is It?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2007,
at C1).
208. HAYES, supra note 193, at 2.
209. See Button, supra note 116, at 574.
210. Id. at 572–73.
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equivalent in greenhouse effect to one ton of carbon dioxide—it is
likely that the value of these credits across markets will vary.211 The
current industry practice, “particularly in the United States, [is] to
treat emissions rights as commodities,” and the “legal and policy
literature” has also referred to them in this respect.212 Their
treatment as such is understandable due to some of the similarities
that commodities and emissions rates share. Both, for example, “can
be sold through spot trades for immediate delivery, or through
futures contracts . . . .”213 Additionally, both are “generally made in
very large volumes” and their prices can be particularly “fluid across
time, but at any given time . . . [their price] will be generally uniform
across the marketplace.”214
Despite these similarities, it would be more beneficial to treat
emissions units in another fashion to encourage global convergence;
this can best be achieved by defining these units in a manner similar
to that of currencies, a method supported by the International
Accounting Standards Board.215 Emissions units and currencies have
many similarities. Both, for example, are useless until the
government establishes and enforces a property right in this area.216
Commodities, in contrast, such as corn or oil, have value regardless
of government endorsement.217
The main benefits of a currency model are that it would promote
environmental integrity, encourage convergence of market systems,
create competition, and foster a desire for the most highly valued
units.218 If carbon is listed as a commodity, the environmental
integrity of the carbon units is jeopardized; the level of regulation
between markets, for example, may vary and create a disparity
between the environmental benefit of each carbon unit.219 Under
this scenario, the treatment of all carbon units as equivalent is unfair
211. Id. at 573.
212. Id. at 575–76.
213. Id. at 576.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 579.
216. Id. at 577; see also Westerfield, supra note 3, at 180 (commenting that the intangible
right to emit nitrous oxide and sulfur dioxide “is a value that previously did not exist until the
government stepped in and said that it was going to enforce a property right in this area”).
217. Button, supra note 116, at 577.
218. Id. at 583–84.
219. Id. at 584–85. This problem is evident in commodities markets where the price of
goods is uniform across the market at any given time. Id. at 588.
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and impractical. This problem could be avoided in a currency model
because there can be different values at any given time—much like
the fluctuation of the Mexican peso to the U.S. dollar—to take into
account the environmental integrity of the unit.220
Because units can be traded at different values, this encourages
the convergence and trade of other carbon units in other markets.
Although trading is not always encouraged between markets at the
present time, a currency model would alter the status quo and
facilitate exchange.221
E. Enforcement
The United States will need to play a central part in any plan to
reduce carbon emissions. The vital role the United States can fulfill is
to verify that emission limits are observed precisely, that the
regulated entities comply, and make clear that if they do not, the
government will enforce penalties for failure to maintain emissions
below a cap.222
The government’s primary responsibility after creating the capand-trade system would be to regulate compliance within the system
in order to achieve the desired level of emissions and to maintain the
integrity of the traded credits.223 Although opponents of cap-andtrade maintain that monitoring of a system is as difficult as obtaining
an accurate reading of greenhouse gas emissions, in reality, much is
possible. A cap-and-trade system focused on large industrial polluters
would be able to monitor this sector to ensure these emissions goals
are met.224
Compliance and enforcement of this system, if comparable to the
U.S. Acid Rain Program, should be relatively high. The U.S. Acid
Rain Program has been one of the EPA’s most successful programs,
in terms of compliance, with a ninety-nine percent compliance
rate.225
The increased costs of bureaucracy that will no doubt result
can be funded through the purchase of the credits on the market.
220. See id. at 588.
221. See id. at 586–87.
222. Bryner, supra note 10, at 979.
223. See Westerfield, supra note 3, at 179–80.
224. Id. (commenting that currently, the emissions from every power plant are known
and are accessible on the web).
225. Id. at 180.
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Offsets can also help funding. President Obama proposes an
allocation of $19 million to the EPA to fund climate change
research.226
VI. CONCLUSION
This Comment has focused on two difficult climate change
questions that currently face policymakers: whether the United States
should take action to mitigate climate change, and how to best
reduce carbon emissions. The United States should recognize that
climate change is occurring and that it will continue to have negative
impacts if action is not taken. Even though it is possible global
warming would not substantially affect the United States’ current
Gross Domestic Product, it is likely that its economic and political
rivals—China and Russia—stand to gain significantly from increases
in global temperatures. To mitigate the United States’ rivals’ possible
gains and to maximize its share of the ever-expanding global carbon
market, the United States should implement a mandatory emissions
reduction program.
Of the two most recognized regulatory programs—carbon tax
and cap-and-trade—a carbon tax would be the most administratively
simple and timely method to reduce carbon emissions. Because
carbon taxes are politically unsavory, however, both domestically and
internationally, they are an unlikely solution to climate change.
Cap-and-trade, a more complex and volatile system, is the
political frontrunner and the solution proposed by President Obama
and his administration. If designed correctly, cap-and-trade offers
many of the same benefits as a carbon tax and also provides more
certainty that environmental goals will be met. A cap-and-trade
system should include the following components: a firm cap, a onehundred percent auction of allowances, carbon offsets,
characterization of carbon in the same manner as a currency, and
enforceability. If these measures are met, cap-and-trade will mitigate
the environmental effects of climate change and ease the transition to
a clean energy economy.
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